By Alan
Caruba
March
marked the ten year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 that deposed
Saddam Hussein. In early April the battle for Baghdad was concluded, but
America’s initial success was followed by years of further conflict and
terrorism against our troops.
The U.S.
stayed on to occupy a nation whose fundamental institutions, its police, army,
and a new government had to be re-built from scratch. It wasn’t that they
didn’t exist before, but that none had the slightest concept of respect for the
law, individual rights, and governance that wasn’t centered in the brutal grasp
of a psychopath and his Baath Party sycophants.
It is
widely agreed now that there were no weapons of mass destruction, but at the time
it was believed by the intelligence agencies of the coalition nations that they
did exist. Essentially, however, America invaded Iraq in 2003 for a reason that
did not exist.
We stayed
on because the Powell Doctrine, named for Colin Powell, Bush’s first Secretary
of State and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who said “if you break it,
you own it.” The initial invasion, including “shock and awe”, was a successful
military action, but when our troops arrived in Baghdad shortly thereafter, it
was swiftly evident that the city and the nation were in chaos.
The Pentagon
planners had not anticipated how bad it would be and gave little indication
they understood anything about the people or their culture. Indeed, much of the
planning was flawed, leaving the U.S. military to “go to war with what you
have” in the words of then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. There was NO
planning for that reconstruction, nor understanding of the need to win the
trust of Iraqis.
What we
had were soldiers wearing Vietnam-era flak jackets that were essentially
useless as well as Hummers that were not protected against explosives or much
else. Anticipating a gas attack, soldiers had to wear protective clothing in
addition to their uniforms and all the gear they had to carry on their backs.
In the summer heat of Iraq it was debilitating, but adding to that were the
logistical supply failures that threatened to leave the troops without food or
water. Iraqi citizens were even more at risk.
An
excellent analysis and report of what that first year was like is provided by
“Breaking Iraq: The Ten Mistakes That Broke Iraq” by Colonel Ted Spain, U.S.
Army (ret) and Terry Turchie, Dept. Asst. Director, FBA (ret). Col. Spain was
the commander of the 18th Military Police (MP) Brigade.
Col. Spain
writes “I knew very well what my mission would be in Iraq. In the midst of an
invasion of a nation and the ouster of a dictator, my soldiers and I would be
largely responsible for replacing decades of tyranny with institutions, people,
and philosophies that would provide a foundation in Iraq for the rule of
law.” That would need senior political
and military leaders who understood the complexities.” For the most part, they
did not. Generals are expected to kill the enemy and destroy their will to
fight on. MPs are expected to restore or establish order where there is none;
much depended on being able to swiftly retrain Saddam’s police in the midst of
a battle zone in a culture were Saddam and his Baathist Party had been the law.
Suffice to say, respect for the rule of law did not exist.
On the
ground, Col. Spain knew going in that “We never really had enough military
police to take on all our responsibilities—jails, prisons, police training, and
patrols.” It was a daunting task made more difficult by a chain of command in
the zone of combat and up the line to the Pentagon and the White House that had
little grasp of the culture, people, and nation they had invaded. “I began to
feel pretty certain that the lack of pre-war decisions about how we planned to
transition Iraq to a country bound by the rule of law had to do more with the
enormous complexity of the concept and not from a devious and uncaring
conspiracy.”
The
appointment of Gen, David Petreaus had much to do with whatever success the
U.S. military achieved in the early years of the war. The U.S. military had
some excellent commanders, but it also had some who simply did not understand
the need to get the population on our side as swiftly as possible.
“Our
methods of trying to bring the rule of law to Iraq and establish law and order
through trust and respect were shoved aside by military and civilian leaders
who simply didn’t know what they were doing and had no understanding of the
role of law enforcement in a democracy.” Despite their best efforts, “Iraq
collapsed into near civil war and open insurrection.”
In that
first year and those that followed some of the population still wanted to fight
us, settle scores with rival sects, and were allied with al Qaeda. A year after
the invasion, incompetence would result in the scandal of detainee abuse at Abu
Ghraib prison. In the end, the Iraq war would stretch out longer than the war
we fought in Vietnam and the U.S. would be told to leave.
Students
of modern warfare will benefit greatly from reading “Breaking Iraq” and others
will gain valuable insight to that first year and what occurred in its wake.
President Obama made no secret of his desire to get out of Afghanistan despite
increasing troop strength in Afghanistan in his first term. The State
Department dropped the ball on a status of forces agreement in Iraq. It
explains why he did not take the lead in the Libyan insurrection and why he
does not want to put boots on the ground in Syria. He’s likely to do nothing
militarily with regard to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.
History is
made by the decisions made or not made by a nation’s leaders and will be
examined for years to come regarding the Iraq invasion and the subsequent
results. Americans can take great pride in our fighting forces, the young men
and women who bore the burden. The outcome, however, of the past decade was
largely a failure of planning and, more importantly, understanding Iraq and, by
extension, the entire Middle East.
© Alan
Caruba, 2013